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EVIDENTIARY HURDLES IN DEFENDING
SEXUAL HARASSMENT SUITS: AMENDED
RULE 412 AND RULE 415 OF THE
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
Kevin C. Kleint
For years women suffered through a "double standard" in Ameri-
can society. Now the tide has turned; Congress has singled out a group
of men as the target of certain legal "double standards."1 And as is
often the case when the legislature attempts to right a legal wrong, the
pendulum has swung too far in the other direction. In 1994, Congress
enacted two rules of evidence that reshaped the standard for admissibil-
ity in sexual harassment suits.2 Amended Rule 412 provides that evi-
dence of an alleged victim's prior sexual behavior or sexual
predisposition will not be admitted unless the probative value substan-
tially outweighs the risk of undue prejudice.3 Conversely, Rule 415 pro-
vides that evidence of the accused's prior misconduct is admissible. 4
While this new plaintiff-friendly evidentiary standard may be "politically
correct," it is fundamentally unfair to defendants and flies in the face of
200 years of American jurisprudence. This article examines the implica-
tions of Amended Rule 412 and Rule 415 and argues for their revision.
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INTRODUCTION
"Whoever fights monsters should see to it that in the process he
does not become a monster."5
The Federal Rules of Evidence generally provide a liberal standard
for the admissibility of evidence.6 Rule 402 states: "All relevant evi-
dence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of
the United States, by Act of Congress, by these rules, or by other rules
prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority."' 7 Rule
403 sets out a balancing test to determine when relevant evidence may be
held inadmissible. 8 Rule 403 states: "Although relevant, evidence may
be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the dan-
ger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the
jury .. .
There are situations, however, when the presumption of admissibil-
ity is not applicable. One exception is Rule 404 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence, which lays out a general ban on character evidence. 10 Rule
404 bars the admission of character evidence to show conformity there-
with except in three narrow circumstances: (1) evidence of an accused's
character may be offered by the accused, or by the prosecution to rebut
character evidence presented by the accused; (2) evidence of the victim's
character may be offered by the accused, or by the prosecution to rebut
the same; and (3) evidence of the character of a witness may be offered
as provided by Rules 607, 608, and 609.11
Amended Rule 412 of the Federal Rules of Evidence ("amended
Rule 412")12 provides another exception to the general presumption of
admissibility.1 3 Rule 412 states: "In a civil case, evidence offered to
prove the sexual behavior or sexual predisposition of any alleged victim
is admissible if it is otherwise admissible under these rules and its proba-
5 Joelle Anne Moreno, Whoever Fights Monsters Should See to it That in the Process
He Does not Become a Monster: Hunting the Sexual Predator With Silver Bullets - Federal
Rules of Evidence 413415 - and a Stake Through the Heart - Kansas v. Hendricks, 49 FLA.
L. REv. 505 (1997) (quoting Friedrich W. Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil 89 (Walter Kauf-
mann trans., 1989)).
6 See generally Michael Graham, NAT'L INST. FOR TRiAL ADVOrCACY, MODERN STATE
AND FEDERAL EVIDENCE: A CowPmENsrVE REFERENCE Tuexr (1989).
7 FED. R. EviD. 402.
8 See FED. R. EvID. 403.
9 Id. (emphasis added).
10 See FED. R. EviD. 404.
11 See FED. R. EvID. 404(a).
12 Throughout this article, the amended version of Rule 412 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence will be referred to as "amended Rule 412." The prior version will be referred to as
"original Rule 412." Citations to original Rule 412 refer to the text of the 1988 version of
Rule 412. Citations to amended Rule 412 refer to the version of the rule applicable after the
1994 amendments.
13 See FED. R. Evm. 412.
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tive value substantially outweighs the danger of harm to any victim and
of unfair prejudice to any party."'1 4 In essence, Rule 412 is an exception
to the second exception to Rule 404. Under Rule 404, evidence of an
alleged victim's character would be admissible if the probative value is
not substantially outweighed by the potential harm from its introduction;
whereas, under Rule 412 evidence of an alleged victim's character will
not be admitted unless the probative value of the proffered evidence sub-
stantially outweighs the potential harm from its introduction. 15 Instead
of a presumption of admissibility, Rule 412 creates presumption of inad-
missibility that may be overcome only by a showing that the probative
value of the evidence in question substantially outweighs the potential
harm from its introduction. 16
While amended Rule 412 carves out an exception to Rule 404, it is
consistent with the general premise behind Rule 404 - that character
evidence is suspect. 17 In contrast to these rules limiting character evi-
dence is Rule 415 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, ("Rule 415"), which
states: "[E]vidence of [an alleged harasser's] commission of another of-
fense or offenses of sexual assault... is admissible."18 Rule 415 makes
evidence of an alleged harasser's prior sexual misconduct presumptively
admissible; whereas, evidence of an alleged victim's sexual behavior and
predisposition is presumptively inadmissible.19
The combined effect of amended Rule 412 and Rule 415 is a funda-
mental unfairness for defendants.20 Rule 412 places a unique burden on
14 Id. (emphasis added).
15 Compare FED. R. EVID. 403 ("Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence)" with FED. R. Evm. 412(b)(2) ("[E]vidence offered to
prove the sexual behavior or sexual predisposition of any alleged victim is admissible if it is
otherwise admissible under these rules and its probative value substantially outweighs the dan-
ger of harm to any victim and of unfair prejudice to any party."). See also FED. R. EvID. 609
(evidence of a prior criminal conviction is not admissible if more than 10 years old "unless the
Court determines... that the probative value substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect").
16 See FED. R. EvID. 412.
17 See David P. Leonard, The Federal Rules of Evidence and the Political Process, 22
FoRD. URB. L.J. 305, 332 (1995). Rule 412 did "not fundamentally change long-held assump-
tions about character evidence except insofar as they reject the generalization that a person's
prior consensual sexual experience makes her more likely to have consented in the present
situation." Id. The rape shield rules follow the general view that "character evidence should
be admitted only in the most limited circumstances." Id.
18 FED. R. Ev. 415.
19 See FED. R. EvID. 415; FED. R. Evn. 412(b).
20 See Coates v. Wal-Mart, 976 P.2d 999, 1013 (N.M. 1999) (Franchini, J., dissenting)
("In a'court of law.., evidence offered to show that a defendant must have done a particular
act on a particular occasion because it conforms to his alleged character is highly suspect and
generally inadmissible."); see also Letter from Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist to the Hon-
orable John F. Gerry, Chair of the Executive Committee of the Judicial Conference of the
United States (April 29, 1994), reprinted in communication from the Chief Justice, the Su-
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the accused by establishing a presumption of inadmissibility regarding
relevant and otherwise admissible evidence.2 1 Conversely, Rule 415
makes evidence of the accused's prior sexual misconduct presumptively
admissible. 22 As Federal District Court Judge Susan Weber Wright
stated: "Rules 412 and 415 have arguably weighed evidence in favor of
alleged victims and against alleged perpetrators. '23
The purpose of this Note is to discuss the implications of these evi-
dentiary standards and argue for their revision. This discussion will fo-
cus on the implications of Rules 412 and 415 in the context of sexual
harassment cases. Part I of this article will briefly outline sexual harass-
ment case law and discuss the "welcomeness" standard. Under the wel-
comeness standard, if the alleged harasser can show that the behavior in
question was welcome, a sexual harassment claim will not stand. Part II
details the origin and evolution of Rules 412 and 415 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence. Part 1I analyzes judicial interpretation of Rule 412
and Rule 415. Part IV presents arguments for a proposed correction of
the evidentiary dilemma posed by Rules 412 and 415 and Part V presents
suggestions for remedying this evidentiary quandary.
I. THE WELCOMENESS STANDARD IN SEXUAL
HARASSMENT CASES
"A plaintiff who participates fully in the sexual banter, exchanges
mutual crudities, or encourages and condones the employer's conduct
cannot claim that her working environment is inhospitable."24
preme Court of the United States, Transmitting an Amendment to the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence as Adopted by the House of Representatives, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2076, HousE
DocuMENT 103-250 (1994) [hereinafter Letter from Chief Justice Rehnquist](the Court, under
the Rules Enabling Act, withheld approval of "[t]hat portion of the proposed amendments to
Rule 412 which would apply that Rule to civil cases .... ).
21 See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 457 U.S. 57 (1986). The court writes:
While "voluntariness" in the sense of consent is not a defense to such a claim [of
sexual harassment], it does not follow that a complainant's sexually provocative
speech or dress is not relevant as a matter of law in determining whether he or she
found particular sexual advances welcome. To the contrary, such evidence is obvi-
ously relevant.
Id. at 69.
22 See FED. R. Evro. 415.
23 The Honorable Susan Weber Wright, Uncertainties in the Law of Sexual Harassment,
33 U. RICH. L. REv. 11, 28 (1999).
24 MACK A. PLAYER, EMPLOYMENT DIsCRIMINATioN LAW 253 (1988); see also BARBARA
LINDEMAN & DAVID D. KAnua, SExuAL HARAssMENT N EMPLOYMENT LAW 505 (1992) ("If a
defendant can show that the plaintiff who complains of vulgar comments and other conduct by
a supervisor or co-worker was also sexually aggressive or engaged in sexually explicit con-
duct, the sexual advances may not meet the 'unwelcome' criteria.").
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There are presently two forms of sexual harassment actionable
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.25 The first occurs when
the employer conditions advancement or job security upon engaging in a
sexual or social relationship with the employer.26 This is commonly re-
ferred to as "quid pro quo" discrimination because employment opportu-
nities are given or withheld as the quid pro quo for a sexual
relationship.2 7 The second type of harassment, referred to as "hostile
work environment" discrimination, involves unwanted behavior that does
not affect economic benefits, but creates a hostile or abusive work
environment.28
A. QUID PRO Quo HARAssmENT
In order to establish a case of sexual harassment under the quid pro
quo theory, a plaintiff must show that he or she was subjected to unwel-
come sexual harassment in the form of sexual advances or requests for
sexual favors and that "submission to the unwelcome advances was an
expressed or implied condition for receiving job benefits, or that refusal
to submit to a superior's demands resulted in a tangible job detriment. '29
Additionally, the alleged victim must show that "the condition of sexual
favors is not imposed on employees of the opposite sex."'30
B. HOSTmE WORK ENVIRONMENT HARASSMENT
Hostile work environment harassment involves
"unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors,
and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual na-
ture"... whether or not it is directly linked to the grant
or denial of an economic quid pro quo, where such con-
duct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfer-
ing with an individual's work performance or creating an
intimidating, hostile or offensive working
environment. 31
In Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, the Supreme Court held that
"Ithe gravamen of any sexual harassment claim is that the alleged sexual
25 See PLAYER, supra note 24, at 199; Jana Howard Carey, Defending Sexual Harass-
ment Claims, in AvoIDING AND LTIGATING SEXUAL HARAssMENT CLmms 1998, at 9 (PLI
Litig & Admin. Practice Course, Handbook Series No. HO-0017 (1998)).
26 See PLAYER, supra note 23, at 249.
27 See id.
28 See Carey, supra note 24, at 9.
29 Id. at 10.
30 PLAYER, supra note 24, at 250.
31 Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986).
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advances were 'unwelcome.' '' 32 The Court stated that "the question
whether particular conduct was indeed unwelcome presents difficult
problems of proof and turn largely on credibility determinations. .... 33
The Court went on to hold that "[t]he correctinquiry is whether the [al-
leged victim] by her conduct indicated that the alleged sexual advances
were unwelcome .... "34
Since Meritor Savings Bank established welcomeness as the con-
trolling element in a sexual harassment suit, "many attorneys have suc-
cessfully defended sexual harassment cases by proving that the alleged
misconduct was not 'unwelcome.' 35 Thus "[t]he plaintiff s invitation to
or provocation of the alleged harassment [became] a focal point of the
[defense]." '36 In particular, evidence of the plaintiff's past sexual conduct
with the alleged harasser was generally considered highly probative of
welcomeness. 37 In most cases, therefore, defense attorneys could offer
legitimate evidence of the plaintiff's conduct toward the alleged harasser
and her co-workers to establish welcomeness. 38
Seven years later, the Supreme Court introduced the "totality of cir-
cumstances" test to determine welcomeness. 39 Under the totality of the
circumstances test, courts are allowed to review the alleged victim's past
conduct in determining whether the accused's behavior constitutes sexual
harassment. 40
The Eighth Circuit recently applied the aforementioned standard in
Scusa v. Nestle U.S.A. Co.41 The court held that to be actionable as hos-
tile work environment sexual harassment, "the conduct at issue must be
'unwelcome' in that the plaintiff neither solicited it nor invited it and
regarded the conduct as undesirable or offensive."42 The court stated:
"The proper inquiry is whether [the alleged victim] indicated by [her]
conduct that the alleged harassment was unwelcome." 43 The court held
that the plaintiff did not create a genuine issue of material fact on the
question of whether the alleged harassment was unwelcome where the
32 Id. at 68.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Carey, supra note 25, at 50.
36 Id.; see also PLAYER, supra note 24, at 505 (When defending a sexual harassment
case, "[tihe examiner should.., explore the complainant's social and sexual conduct to under-
cut the claim that the advances were unwelcome.").
37 See PLAYER, supra note 24, at 505.
38 See id.
39 See Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993).
40 See LiNDEMAN & KADuE, supra note 24, at 505.
41 See 181 F.3d 958 (8' Cir. 1999) (upholding summary judgment where the plaintiff
could not show that the alleged behavior was "unwelcome").
42 Id. at 966 (referring to Meritor Say. Bank. v. Vinson, 477 U.S. at 68.).
43 Id. (quoting Quick v. Donaldson Co., 90 F.3d 1372, 1387 (8h" Cir. 1996)).
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undisputed evidence showed that the plaintiff engaged in behavior simi-
lar to that which she claimed was unwelcome and offensive.44
II. THE EVOLUTION OF EVIDENTIARY STANDARDS IN
SEXUAL HARASSMENT CASES
During the first 35 years of their existence, the Federal Rules of
Evidence represented a fairly conservative codification of the common
law.45 For the most part, the drafters simply adopted common law
rules.46
A. RULE 404 - GENERAL BAN ON CHARACTER EVIDENCE
To understand the implications of Rules 412 and 415, it is necessary
to understand the general ban on character evidence, which has been a
part of American jurisprudence for nearly 200 years.47 The adoption of
the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975 greatly expanded the approved
uses of prior-misconduct evidence.48 But, up until 1994, use of character
evidence for the purpose of showing propensity remained forbidden.49
Rule 404 of the Federal Rules of Evidence codifies the common law's
general ban on character evidence. Rule 404 reads:
(A) CHARACTER EVIDENCE GENERALLY. Evidence of a
person's character or a trait of character is not admissible
for the purpose of proving action in conformity there-
with on a particular occasion, except:
(1) CHARACTER OF ACCUSED. Evidence of a pertinent
trait of character offered by an accused or by the prose-
cution to rebut the same;
(2) CHARACTER OF VICTim. Evidence of a pertinent trait
of character of the victim of the crime offered by an
accused ....
(B) OTHER CRIMES, WRONGS, ACTS. Evidence of other
crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the
character of a person in order to show action in conform-
ity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other
purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
44 See id. (the plaintiff "admitted that she had used the 'f' word in front of both men and
women.. .and that she had told off-color jokes at work and teased other employees").
45 See Leonard, supra note 17, at 312.
46 See id. at 313.
47 See Jeffrey G. Pickett, The Presumption of Innocence Imperiled: The New Federal
Rules of Evidence 413-415 and the Use of Other Sexual-Offense Evidence in Washington, 70
WASH. L. Rv. 883, 885 (1995).
48 See id. at 885-86.
49 See id. at 886.
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preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of
mistake or accident .... 50
As is obvious from reading Rule 404, character evidence is disfa-
vored. 51 Evidence of the alleged victim's character to prove propensity
is barred, with a few narrow exceptions.5 2 Evidence of the accused's
character to prove propensity is absolutely barred, unless he or she puts
character "in issue."53
B. ORiGiNAL RuLE 412
It appears that Congress now sees the Federal Rules as an opportu-
nity to make social policy.54 The first example of substantive change in
the Federal Rules was the passage of Rule 412 (commonly known as "the
Rape Shield Law") in 1978. 5 Rule 412, however, did very little to alter
the law or. structure of evidentiary rules and did "not fundamentally
change long-held assumptions about character evidence except insofar as
[it] reject[ed] the generalization that a person's prior consensual sexual
experience makes her more likely to have consented in the present situa-
tion. ' '56 Original Rule 412 followed the general view that character evi-
dence should be admitted in only certain limited circumstances. 57
In its original form, Rule 412 was applicable only in criminal
cases. 58 It spelled out when, and. under what conditions, evidence of a
rape victim's prior sexual behavior would be admitted.59 Original Rule
412 provided that a court could not admit evidence of specific instances
of a rape victim's prior sexual conduct except in three narrowly defined
circumstances:
(1) where the Constitution requires that the evidence be
admitted [;]
(2) where the defendant raises the issue of consent and
the evidence is of sexual behavior with the defendant [;]
and
(3) where the evidence is of behavior with someone
other than the defendant and is offered by the defendant
50 FED. R. Evm. 404.
51 See id.
52 See id.
53 See id.
54 See Leonard, supra note 17.
55 See id. at 327-33.
56 Id. at 331-32.
57 See id.
58 See GLEN WEISENBERGER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE 170 (3d ed. 1998).
59 See id.
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on the issue of whether he was the source of semen or
injury.60
Congressman Mann of South Carolina, one of the bill's sponsors,
stated that the principle purpose of Rule 412 was "to protect rape victims
from the degrading and embarrassing disclosure of intimate details about
their private lives. '61
C. THE 1994 AMENDMENT TO RULE 412
In the summer of 1993, Congress proposed a number of changes to
the Federal Rules of Evidence, one of which would make Rule 412 appli-
cable to civil cases. 62 As published for comment, the proposed amend-
ment contained two alternate exceptions for civil cases:
(1) evidence of sexual behavior or predisposition would
be admissible if it were essential to a fair and accurate
determination of a claim or defense or [(2) evidence of
sexual behavior or predisposition would be admissible]
if its probative value substantially outweighs the danger
of unfair prejudice to the parties and harm to the
victim. 63
Despite heavy criticism from commentators, the Advisory Committee
decided on the second option, the balancing test.64
On October 25, 1993, the proposed changes were sent to the United
States Supreme Court so that it could make its own rules of conduct and
procedure pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act.65 The Court approved the
proposed changes and forwarded them to Congress, with one exception;
the Court withheld approval of section (b)(2) of Rule 412.66 Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist stated "some Justices [of the Supreme Court] expressed
concern that the proposed amendment [to Rule 412] might encroach on
the rights of defendants." 67
60 FED. R. EvD. 412 (1978) (amended 1994).
61 124 CONG. REc. HI 1944 (daily ed. Oct. 10, 1978) (statement of Rep. Mann), quoted
in FED. R. EvD. 412 Historical Note (West 1994)).
62 See Paul Nicholas Monnin, Proving Welcomeness: The Admissibility of Evidence of
Sexual History in Sexual Harassment Claims under the 1994 Amendments to Federal Rule of
Evidence 412, 48 VAND. L. Rnv. 1155, 1172 (1995).
63 Id. at 1174 (citing Proposed FED. R. EvID. 412(b)(4)).
64 See id. at 1174-75.
65 See Letter from Chief Justice Rehnquist, supra note 20.
66 See id; see also FED. R. EvD. 412(b)(2)("In a civil case, evidence offered to prove the
sexual behavior or sexual predisposition of any alleged victim is admissible if it is otherwise
admissible under these rules and its probative value substantially outweighs the danger of
harm to the victim or unfair prejudice to any party.").
67 See Letter from Chief Justice Rehnquist, supra note 20.
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On August 25, 1994, the House of Representatives and Senate
passed Amended Rule 412 as part of the Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act of 1994 ("1994 Crime Act"), over the Supreme Court's
objection.68 The 1994 Crime Act contained a provision that amended
Rule 412 to make it applicable to civil actions involving alleged sexual
misconduct. 69 Amended Rule 412, in relevant part, reads:
(a) EVIDENCE, GENERALLY INADMISSIBLE. The following
evidence is not admissible in any civil or criminal pro-
ceeding involving alleged sexual misconduct except as
provided in subdivisions (b) and (c):
(1) Evidence offered to prove that any alleged victim en-
gaged in other sexual behavior.
(2) Evidence offered to prove any alleged victims sexual
predisposition.
(b) ExCEPrIONS
(2) In a civil case, evidence offered to prove the sexual
behavior or sexual predisposition of any alleged victim
is admissible if it is otherwise admissible under these
rules and its probative value substantially outweighs the
danger of harm to any victim and of unfair prejudice to
any party. Evidence of an alleged victims reputation is
admissible only if it has been placed in, controversy by
the alleged victim.
(C) PROCEDURE TO DETERMINE ADMISSIBILITY.
(1) A party intending to offer evidence under subdivision
(b) must:
(A) file a written motion at least 14 days before trial spe-
cifically describing the evidence and stating the purpose
for which it is offered unless the court, for good cause
requires a different time for filing or permits filing dur-
ing trial; and
(B) serve the motion on all parties and notify the alleged
victim or, when appropriate, the alleged victim's guard-
ian or representative.
(2) Before admitting evidence under this rule the court
must conduct a hearing in camera and afford the victim
68 See Violent Crime Control and Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322,
§ 40141, 108 Stat. 1796, 1918 (1994); see also Letter from Chief Justice Rehnquist, supra note
20.
69 See Violent Crime Control and Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322,
§ 40141, 108 Stat. 1796, 1918 (1994); see also FED. R. EvID. 412 Advisory Committee's Note
("Rule 412 applies to any civil case in which a person claims to be the victim of sexual
misconduct, such as sexual battery or harassment.").
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and parties a right to attend and be heard. The motion,
related papers, and the record of the hearing must be
sealed and remain under seal unless the court orders
otherwise.70
The Advisory Committee Notes describe the term "sexual behavior"
as "all activities that involve actual physical conduct, i.e., sexual inter-
course or sexual contact. ' 71 The Comnmittee went on to state "the word
'behavior' should be construed to include activities of the mind, such as
fantasies or dreams."'72 "Sexual predisposition" is defined as "evidence
that does not directly refer to sexual activities or thoughts but that the
proponent believes may have a sexual connotation for the factfinder." 73
Thus, "evidence such as that relating to the alleged victim's mode of
dress, speech, or lifestyle will not be admissible. '74
D. THE ADDITION OF RULE 415
Another change in the evidentiary landscape resulting from the
1994 Crime Act was the addition of Rule 415 to the Federal Rules of
Evidence.75 Rule 415 addresses the issue of what evidence of similar
sexual activity the alleged victim may introduce to show a pattern on the
part of the accused.76
The importance of Rule 415 is that it replaces Rule 404 of the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence as the applicable standard for admitting character
evidence of a sexual nature. Rule 415 provides a specific admissibility
standard in civil sexual misconduct cases, replacing Rule 404's general
ban on the admission of character evidence. 77
Essentially, Rule 415 is a codification of the "lustful disposition"
exception to the general ban on character evidence, which allows admis-
sion of evidence "showing a passion for unusual or abnormal sexual grat-
ification. '78 One version of the lustful disposition exception restricts use
of prior sexual-misconduct evidence to cases where the victim of the
uncharged and tfie charged crimes is the same person.79 The evidence is
thus probative of the defendant's actions toward the particular victim.80
70 FED. R. Evm. 412.
71 FED. R. EVID. 412 Advisory Committee's Note.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 See Violent Crime Control and Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322,
§ 40141, 108 Stat. 1796, 1918 (1994).
76 See FED. R. EvID. 415.
77 See United States v. Roberts, 88 F.3d 872, 876 (10th Cir. 1996).
78 Pickett, supra note 47, at 889.
79 See id.
80 See id.
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A more inclusive version of the lustful disposition rule focuses not
on the victim, but on the defendant's general sexual deviance or aggres-
siveness.81 As one commentator has described the broad exception:
"Uncharged-sexual-offense evidence will be admissible to prove that the
defendant suffers from a general compulsion for sexual deviance, even
where the charged crime is quite different from the prior misconduct. 82
This version of the lustful disposition rule is similar to Rule 415. In
relevant part, Rule 415 states:
In a civil case in which a claim for damages or other
relief is predicated on a party's alleged commission of
conduct constituting an offense of sexual assault ... ,
evidence of that party's commission of another offense
or offenses of sexual assault ... is admissible and may
be considered as provided in Rule 413 .... 83
Section (d) of Rule 413 defines sexual assault for the purposes of
Rule 415 as:
(1) any conduct proscribed by Chapter 109A of Title 18,
United States Code;
(2) contact, without consent, between any part of the de-
fendant's body or an object and the genitals or anus of
another person;
(3) contact, without consent, between the genitals or
anus of the defendant and any part of another person's
body;
(4) deriving sexual pleasure or gratification from the in-
fliction of death, bodily injury, or physical pain on an-
other person; or, an attempt or conspiracy to engage in
conduct described in paragraphs (1)-(4).84
Prior to the passage of Rules 415, an alleged harasser could prevent
character evidence from being admitted under Rule 404.85 Rule 415 en-
larges the admissibility of evidence of past sexual conduct that was for-
merly restricted by rule 404.86 Under Rule 404, "evidence of past
wrongs is admissible for limited purposes, including proof of motive of
knowledge, but not to allow an inference of conduct in conformance with
81 See id.
82 Id. at 890 (emphasis added).
83 FED. R. Evm. 415 (emphasis added).
84 FED. R. Evro. 413(d). The importance of this definition is that it can be construed to
include such innocuous acts as a baseball coach slapping a player on the rear-end as he rounds
third base.
85 See FED. R. Evlo. 404; see also Cleveland v. KFC Nat'l Mgmt. Co., 948 F. Supp. 62,
65 (N.D. Ga. 1996).
86 See WEISENBERGER, supra note 63, at 184-85.
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the past wrong. ' 87 The new rules are designed to change this, so that
evidence of the bad character of the offender may be admitted for any
relevant purpose.88
While Rule 403 should still apply to evidence admitted under Rules
415, the new rules will affect how courts apply the Rule 403 balancing
test.89 Rule 415 allows the trier of fact to consider evidence of other
instances of sexual assault for any matter to which it is relevant.90 Rule
415, therefore, "imbue[s] the evidence with more probative value than it
would have under Rule 404."91 The evidence can be considered for its
probative value establishing the defendant's propensity to engage in such
conduct in addition to its probative value in establishing motive, knowl-
edge, or intent.92 Because of the greater weight given to such evidence,
the evidence is less likely to be excluded under Rule 403.93
III. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF RULES 412 AND 415
A. RULE 412
Since the 1994 amendment to Rule 412, relatively few courts have
devoted significant time to Rule 412's application to civil cases. This
section will discuss the diverging philosophies courts have employed
when applying Rule 412 to civil actions.
First, Rule 412 bars the admission of "evidence offered to prove that
any alleged victim engaged in other sexual behavior. '94 Sexual behavior
is defined to include "all activities, other than those 'intrinsic' to the
alleged misconduct, that involve sexual intercourse or sexual contact, or
that imply such physical conduct. 95 Additionally, Rule 412 "precludes
the introduction of evidence 'offered to prove any alleged victim's sexual
predisposition.'1, 96 Rule 412 is designed to prevent the defendant from
offering "evidence 'relating to the alleged victim's mode of dress,
speech, or lifestyle,' and other evidence that... the proponent believes
may have a sexual connotation for the factfinder. ' 97
87 Id. at 185.
88 See id.
89 See id.
90 See id.
91 Id.
92 See id. at 184-85.
93 See id.
94 FED. R. EVID. 412(a)(1).
95 Truong v. Smith, 183 F.R.D. 273, 274 (D.Colo. 1998) (citing FED. R. EVID. 412
Advisory Committee's Note).
96 Id. (citing FED. R. EviD. 412(a)(2)).
97 Id. (citing FED R. EVID. 412 Advisory Committee's Note).
EVIDENTIARY HURDLES
1. In the Context of Discovery
a. Protective Orders
In Herchenroeder v. Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics
Laboratory, the plaintiff alleged that she was sexually harassed by her
former supervisor.98 She also alleged that the supervisor defamed her by
accusing her of having sexual relations with another employee.9 9 During
the defendant's deposition of the plaintiff, the defendant asked the plain-
tiff if she had ever discussed engaging in sexual activity with the co-
worker.'0 0 The court recognized that in determining whether discovery
is appropriate, it must look to both Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and Rule 412 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.' 0 ' After de-
termining that the questions posed to the alleged victim were relevant
under Rule 26 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court held that "the
requested discovery should [not] be permitted without an appropriate
protective order/confidentiality agreement as contemplated by Rule
412."102
In Sanchez v. Zabihi, the court held that since the employer was
raising the defense that the alleged victim was the sexual aggressor, the
alleged victim was required to respond to the defendant's interrogatory
regarding the alleged victim's past history of making sexual or romantic
advances towards other employees, within parameters established by the
judge. 10 3 The court determined that the appropriate question is whether
the information sought was "reasonably calculated to lead to the discov-
ery of admissible evidence in light of the parties claims and defenses,
while remaining mindful of the policy underlying Rule 412 that protects
victims of sexual misconduct from undue embarrassment and intrusion
into their private affairs. "l4 The court limited the defendant's interro-
gatory to "matters occurring three years before the alleged incidents of
sexual harassment."'10 5 The inquiry was further tailored such that the
alleged victim was "not required to answer about any matter involving
the co-worker who later became her spouse."' 0 6 Additionally, the plain-
tiff's answers were subject to a protective order barring anyone but the
defendant's attorney from reviewing them.10 7
98 See 171 F.R.D. 179, 180 (D.Md. 1997).
99 See id.
100 See id.
101 See id. at 182.
102 Id. (emphasis added).
103 See 166 F.R.D. 500, 502 (D.N.M. 1996).
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 See id.
2000]
730 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 9:715
In contrast, the court in Weber v. Multimedia Entertainment, Inc.
stated that the plaintiff "is not a 'victim of sexual misconduct' and thus,
even if Federal Rule of Evidence 412 controlled the scope of pretrial
discovery, which it does not, she is not entitled to the protection of Rule
412 ...."108
b. Precluding Discovery
Unlike the Weber court, the court Barta v. City and County of Hon-
olulu found that Rule 412 applied to discovery. 10 9 In Barta, the court
held Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which generally
governs discovery, is limited by the Rules of Evidence."*0 The court
stated: "Although Rule 412 is a rule controlling the admissibility of evi-
dence rather than its discoverability, Rule 412 must inform the proper
scope of discovery .... ,,i
The court noted: "[A] central purpose of Rule 412 is to 'safeguard
the alleged victim against the invasion of privacy, potential embarrass-
ment and sexual stereotyping that is associated with public disclosure of
intimate sexual details and the infusion of sexual innuendo into the fact-
finding process."'112 The court, therefore, imposed "restrictions on dis-
covery to preclude inquiry into areas which will clearly fail to satisfy the
balancing test of Rule 412(b)(2)." 3 Ultimately the court allowed dis-
covery of evidence concerning the alleged victim's conduct on-duty at
work and with the named defendants, but protected evidence as to her
sexual conduct while she was away from work was from discovery.' 14
2. Punishing Defendants
In Sheffield v. Hilltop Sand & Gravel Co., Inc., the court was
presented with the issue of how to prove welcomeness in a sexual harass-
ment suit in light of Rule 412.115 However, the court did not reach the
issue of admissibility under Rule 412; instead, the court chose to sanction
the defendant for its disregard of the procedures articulated in Rule
412(c).116
108 1997 WL 729039 (S.D.N.Y.)(emphasis added).
109 See 169 F.R.D. 132 (D.Hawaii 1996).
110 See id. at 135; see also FED. R. CIV. PRoc. 26(b)(1) ("Parties may obtain discovery
regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the
pending action... which appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence.).
I Id.
112 Id. (internal citations omitted).
"1 Id.
114 See id. at 135-36.
115 See 895 F. Supp. 105, 109 (E.D. Va. 1995).
116 See id.
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The evidence sought to be offered by the defendant included the
plaintiff's description of her sexual relations with her husband, and the
plaintiff's use of vulgar language in the workplace. 17 The defendant
argued "that the proffered evidence concern[ed] the extent to which the
plaintiff was involved in sexually explicit discussions in the work-
place." 118 The defendant contended that such evidence went to wel-
comeness and therefore should be governed by Rule 403.119 Thus, the
defendant did not request that the motion they filed be placed under seal
in accordance with Rule 412(c). 120
The court concluded "that the disputed evidence endeavors to estab-
lish the plaintiffs sexual behavior and her predisposition to engage in
such conduct."' 21 Accordingly, the court determined that Rule 412 must
govern the admissibility of such evidence. 122 The court stated: "The
overarching purpose of Rule 412, and of the procedures outlined in sub-
division (c), is to protect alleged victims against 'the invasion of privacy,
potential embarrassment, and sexual stereotyping that is associated with
public disclosure of intimate sexual details."1 23 The court found that
"[b]y ignoring the express requirements of Rule 412(c), the defendant
frustrated Rule 412's objectives and presumptively inflicted harm upon
the plaintiff."' 24 The court determined that it would hear testimony from
the alleged harasser, but would exclude all other testimony on the issue
of the plaintiffs conduct in the workplace.'2 5
3. In the Context of Admissibility
Courts differ in their determination of whether or not evidence of
prior sexual conduct is precluded by Rule 412. Courts look to the poten-
tial harm, relevance, and context in which the past behavior took place.
In Rodriguez-Hernandez v. Miranda-Velez, the court stated: "Rule
412... reverses the usual approach of the Federal Rules of Evidence on
admissibility by requiring that the evidence's probative value 'substan-
tially outweigh' its prejudicial effect."' 126 In that case, the defendants
complained of a "double standard" because the district court had admit-
ted evidence introduced by the plaintiff while excluding evidence intro-
duced by the defendant.' 27
117 See id.
118 Id.
119 See id. at 108.
120 See id.
121 Id.
122 See id.
123 Id. at 109 (internal citations omitted).
124 Id.
125 See id.
126 132 F.3d 848, 856 (st Cir. 1998).
127 See id.
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In response, the First Circuit stated: "[A]s to the excluded evidence,
Fed. R. Evid. 412 required the district court to apply a stricter standard
with regard to admission of evidence of plaintiff's sexual history than to
the evidence admitted under the more liberal standard of Fed. R. Evid.
402 & 403. '"128, Ultimately, the court held that the district court struck an
acceptable balance between the danger of undue prejudice and the need
to present the jury with relevant evidence:
The district court [held] that evidence concerning the
plaintiff's moral character or promiscuity and the marital
status of her boyfriend was inadmissible under Rule 412.
But the court allowed [the] defendants to introduce evi-
dence directly relevant to their theory that plaintiffs re-
lationship distracted her from [her] work. The court also
held that evidence concerning plaintiff's allegedly flirta-
tious behavior toward Miranda, [the alleged harasser,]
was admissible to determine whether Miranda's ad-
vances were in fact [unwelcome]. 129
Perhaps the best example of an evidentiary ruling that contradicts
common sense is in Socks-Brunot v. Hirschvogel Inc.130 In discussing the
welcomeness standard in light of Rule 412, the court stated that "evi-
dence of the plaintiff's speech, lifestyle, sexual behavior, or predisposi-
tion is inadmissible" even if it goes to welcomeness, if Rule 412(b)(2) is
not satisfied.' 3 '
In that case, the defense offered testimony to show that the alleged
victim had "flirted with" the individual who allegedly created a hostile
work environment by making sexually suggestive comments. 132 The de-
fendant argued that such conduct was "relevant to the issue of welcome-
ness and was therefore beyond the scope of Rule 412."' 33 The court
determined that "[e]vidence that a plaintiff in a sexual harassment case
may have flirted with the alleged harasser is clearly within the type of
conduct described as 'sexual behavior' or 'sexual predisposition' in Rule
412."134
The court stated that "[w]hile relevant evidence is generally admis-
sible under Federal Rule of Evidence 403, evidence subject to Rule 412
is presumptively inadmissible, even when offered to disprove 'un-
128 Id. at 857.
129 Id.
130 See 184 F.R.D. 113 (S.D. Ohio 1999)
131 Id. at 118 (citing Sheffield v. Hilltop Sand & Gravel Co. 895 F. Supp. 105 (E.D. Va.
1995)).
132 Id. at 122.
133 Id. at 118.
134 Id. at 122.
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welcomeness' in a sexual harassment case."'135 The court held that "such
evidence could not meet the standard set forth in Rule 412(b)(2) in that
the probative value is weak and the potential harm or prejudice to the
alleged victim is strong."'136 The court was concerned that "[s]uch testi-
mony could improperly paint the plaintiff as having invited sexual har-
assment .... -137 The court ultimately determined that admitting such
evidence at the trial court level was in error and granted the plaintiff a
new trial. 138
In contrast is the court's analysis in Fedio v. Circuit City.1 3 9 In
Fedio, the court determined that evidence of the plaintiff's workplace
demeanor "is highly probative of how little [she] would be offended by
[the alleged harasser's] sexual innuendoes when she in fact felt comforta-
ble publicizing information regarding her sex life."'140 The plaintiff ar-
gued that the following evidence should have been excluded:
(1) her statement at work that she was going to wear a
finger ring until she "got laid," and the fact that she sub-
sequently removed the ring; (2) her statement about
keeping a delivery driver waiting outside her apartment
while she engaged in sexual intercourse with her room-
mate; and (3) the fact that she had been the victim of a
date rape prior to obtaining employment with the
defendant. 141
The plaintiff cited case law indicating that a plaintiffs "sexual conduct
occurring outside of the workplace should be excluded while similar con-
duct occurring inside the workplace is generally admissible."'142 How-
ever, the court ultimately admitted the evidence.
The court determined that although some of the incidents the plain-
tiff wished to exclude occurred outside of the workplace, the fact that she
boasted about them in the workplace "ma[de] them relevant to [the
court's] proceedings."'143 The court further stated that admitting the
aforementioned evidence was necessary to effectuate the rule's underly-
ing purpose."44 The court stated: "Case law and relevant doctrine speak
of the need to shelter alleged victims of sexual misconduct by disallow-
ing others the opportunity to dig into their past and make known their
135 Id. at 119 (emphasis added).
136 Id. at 122.
137 Id.
138 See id. at 124.
139 See 1998 WL 966000 (E.D. Pa. 1998).
140 Id. at *6.
141 Id. at *5.
142 Id. at *6, n.7.
143 Id.
144 See id.
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most intimate secrets."' 45 However, in the instant case, the plaintiff had
volunteered information to her co-workers regarding her sexual behavior
and predisposition.146 The court reasoned that allowing the plaintiff to
publicly "flaunt her sexual behaviors and yet remain protected by Rule
412 would be tantamount to a complete disregard of the rule's
purpose."'147
In Janoupoulos v. Harvey L. Walner & Associates, the court held
that Rule 412 does not preclude evidence of the plaintiff's prior marital
history. 148 The court found that although marital history and sexual be-
havior "are necessarily related, Rule 412 does not give [the] court the
authority to exclude evidence of past marriages, only past sexual behav-
ior.".149 However, the court excluded evidence relating to plaintiff's
marital history pursuant to Rules 401 and 402, finding that the proffered
evidence was not relevant and thus not admissible. 150
In Meyer-Dupis v. Thompson Newspapers, Inc., the Court of Ap-
peals upheld the district court's decision to admit evidence of what plain-
tiff said in situations where there was no reasonable expectation of
privacy (company meetings, informal get-togethers in the "smoke-
room," or comments to co-employees that were made in the general
workplace with other employees present) and disallow all other evidence
of sexually provocative speech.' 5 l The court ruled that the testimony in
which a co-worker of the alleged victim described a sexual conversation
between the alleged victim and several other co-workers, and the testi-
mony of the alleged harasser in which he described similar conversa-
tions, was properly admitted. 152 The court stated: "Although the
[district] court did not follow the procedure stated in the rule, both par-
ties were aware of the testimony before its presentation and had ample
opportunity to be heard regarding its admissibility."'153
145 Id. (citing FED. R. Evu. 412 Advisory Committee's Note (1994 amend.) ("The rule
aims to safeguard the alleged victim against the invasion of privacy, potential embarrassment
and sexual stereotyping that is associated with public disclosure of intimate sexual de-
tails .... ); see also Sanchez v. Zabihi, 166 F.R.D. 500, 502 (D.N.M. 1996) (stating that
"Rule 412... protects victims of sexual misconduct from undue embarrassment and intrusion
into their private affairs").
146 Fedio, 1998 WL 966000, at *6.
147 Id.
148 See 1995 WL 107170 (N.D. Il. 1995).
149 Id. (emphasis added).
150 See id.
151 GET FULL CITE
152 See id.
153 Id.
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B. RuLE 415
1. Rule 415 Replaces Rule 404's General Ban on Character
Evidence
Evidence of prior-misconduct has been prohibited in Anglo-Ameri-
can jurisprudence for nearly 200 years. 154 The adoption of the Federal
Rules of Evidence in 1975 greatly expanded the approved uses of prior-
misconduct evidence. 155 But up until 1994, use of such evidence for the
purpose of showing propensity remained forbidden. 156 Rule 404(a),
which had previously governed the admissibility of character evidence,
reads: "Evidence of a person's character or a trait of character is not
admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a
particular occasion ....
The new rules of evidence provide that such evidence "may be con-
sidered for its bearing on any matter to which it is relevant."'158 The
congressional sponsors of rule 415 made clear that relevant uses of prior-
sexual-offense include proving that a defendant "acted in conformity
with his or her character;" a use which was contrary to Rule 404(b). 159
Under the new rules prosecutors or plaintiffs are not restricted to
conclusive evidence.' 60 In fact, they "are free to use even unproven (and
perhaps false) allegations of sexual misconduct."'161 As one commenta-
tor suggested, "antagonistic accusers with stale, uncertain, and possibly
false allegations can easily come out of the woodwork'after it becomes
widely known that an accused rapist is heading for trial on either civil or
criminal charges."'1 62
154 See Pickett, supra note 47, at 885.
155 See id.
156 See id. at 886.
157 FED. R. EviD. 404(a) (emphasis added).
158 FED. R. EvmD. 413-15.
159 140 CONG. RFc. H8968-01 (daily ed. Aug. 21, 1994) (statement of Rep. Molinari).
Prior to the adopting of these rules, FED. R. EvmD. 404(b) governed character evidence. Rule
404(b) states:
(b) OTHER CRIMES, WRONGS, OR ACTS. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is
not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conform-
ity therewith. It may however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of
mistake or accident, provided that upon request by the accused, the prosecution in a
criminal case shall provide reasonable notice in advance of trial....
160 See James Joseph Duane, The New Federal Rules of Evidence of Prior Acts of Ac-
cused Sex Offenders, 157 F.R.D. 95, 109 (1994).
161 Id.
162 Id.
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2. Applied Against the Backdrop of Rule 403
The Second Circuit held in United States v. Larson that a Rule 403
analysis of evidence offered under Rule 414 is consistent with congres-
sional intent. 163 Later, in United States v. Sumner, the court cited Larson
in holding that Rule 403 applies to Rule 413-415 decisions. 164 Both
courts relied on the statements of Senator Dole and Representative
Molinari, the principal congressional sponsors of Rules 413-415: "[T]he
general standards of the rules of evidence will continue to apply, includ-
ing ... the court's authority under Evidence Rule 403 to exclude evi-
dence whose probative value is substantially outweighed by its
prejudicial effect."'165
However, note that the application of Rule 403 in this context is
colored by the new rules. In other words, courts applying Rule 403 in
this situation look to Rules 413-415 for guidance. As the court stated in
United States v. Mound, "[i]n considering evidence offered under Rules
413, 414, and 415, a trial court must still apply Rule 403, though in such
a way as 'to allow [the new rules their] intended effect.' "166 Addition-
ally, in United States v. Mann, the court stated that the unique nature of
character evidence requires that the trial court "make a reasoned, re-
corded statement of its 403 decision when it admits evidence under Rules
413-415."167
3. Constitutionality of Rules 413-415
Several courts have passed on the issue of whether Rules 413-415
violate the constitutional rights of defendants. Courts addressing this is-
sue have uniformly rejected the idea that these rules violate the Constitu-
tion. 168 They have, however, recognized that the new rules present
serious constitutional concerns. 169
For example, in United States v. Enjady, the Tenth Circuit stated:
"Rule 413 [which is cut from the same cloth as Rule 415] raises a serious
constitutional due process issue.' 170 The court noted that the rule was
passed by a Congress that overrode the concern of "the Judicial Confer-
ence and its Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence and
163 See 112 F.3d 600, 604 (2d. Cir. 1997).
164 See 119 F. 3d 658, 662 (1997).
165 Id.; see also Larson, 112 F.3d 604, (both citing 140 CONG. Rac. S12990 (daily ed.
Sept. 20, 1994) (Statement of Sen. Dole); 140 CONG. REc. H8991 (daily ed. Aug. 21, 1994)
(Statement of Rep. Molinari)).
166 149 F.3d 799, 800 (internal citations omitted).
167 145 F.3d 1347 (10th Cir. 1998).
168 See e.g., United States v. Enjady, 134 F.3d 1427, 1431-32 (10th Cir. 1998).
169 See id. at 1430.
170 Id.
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its Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."171
The court also noted that "[a] number of commentators have expressed
views on [the new Rule's] constitutionality, several arguing that it is
unconstitutional." 172
In Enjady, the court determined that Rule 413, subject to the protec-
tions of Rule 403, did not violate the Due Process Clause. 173 The court
stated that although the practice of excluding evidence of prior bad acts
is ancient, that "does not mean that it is embodied in the Constitution."'174
The Enjady court relied on Spencer v. Texas,175 a Supreme Court
decision upholding a Texas statute which allowed the admission of prior
convictions for certain offenses.176 In Spencer, the Supreme Court
stated: "[I]t has never been thought that [Due Process fundamental fair-
ness] cases establish this Court as a rulemaking organ for the promulga-
tion of state rules of criminal procedure."' 177 Discussing the Spencer
decision, the Enjady court noted that although "most federal procedural
rules are promulgated under the auspices of the Supreme Court and the
Rules Enabling Act[,] . . .Congress has the ultimate power over the
enactment of rules .... ,,178
Congressional sponsors have indicated, and the courts have reiter-
ated, that Rule 403 is still to be used to determine whether evidence of
the accused's prior sexual misconduct is admissible. 179 However, the leg-
islature has performed most of the 403 calculus, determining that evi-
dence of an accused's prior misconduct is highly probative. For
example, Representative Molinari stated that evidence of an alleged har-
asser's prior sexual conduct is "typically relevant and probative:"
The practical effect of the new rules is to put evidence of
uncharged offenses in sexual assault and child molesta-
tion cases [and sexual harassment cases] on the same
footing as other types of relevant evidence that are not
subject to a special exclusionary rule. The presumption
is of admission. The underlying legislative judgment is
that the evidence admissible pursuant to the proposed
rule is typically relevant and probative and that its pro-
171 Id.
172 Id.
173 See id. at 1433.
174 Id. at 1432.
175 See 385 U.S. 554 (1967).
176 See Enjady, 134 F.3d at 1432.
177 Spencer, 385 U.S. at 564.
178 Enjady, 134 F.3d at 1432.
179 See supra Part IH.B.2.
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bative value is normally not outweighed by any risk of
prejudice or other adverse effects. 180
The Congressional Record also states:
Another ground for consideration is probability. For ex-
ample, consider a rape case in which the defense attacks
the victim's assertion that she did not consent, or repre-
sents that the whole incident was made up by the victim.
If there is conclusive evidence that the defendant had
previously engaged in similar acts-such as a prior con-
viction of the defendant for rape-then the defense's
claim of consent of fabrication would normally amount
to a contention that the victim made up a false charge of
rape against a person who just happened to be a rapist.
The inherent improbability of such a coincidence gives
similar crimes evidence a high degree of probative
value, and supports its admission in such a case. 181
The court in Cleveland v. KFC National Management Co., citing
the above passage, set out a low hurdle for admissibility of an alleged
harasser's prior misconduct. 182 The court stated that there were "ample
allegations of sexual harassment... includ[ing] the touching of plain-
tiff's body in a overt sexual manner." 183 The court held that "[i]f plain-
tiff wants to enter evidence of past sexual misconduct, it would
corroborate her story and thus be probative." 184 The court went on to
state, "[U]nder Rule 415, evidence of past misconduct that supports
plaintiff's story should be admitted."' 185
IV. THE ARGUMENT FOR REVISION
These rules have been heavily criticized by commentators.' 8 6 What
is the combined effect of the 1994 amendments to a defendant in a sexual
180 United States v. Sumner, 119 F.3d 658, 662 (8"' Cir. 1997) (citing 140 CONG. REC.
H8992 (daily ed. Aug. 21 1994) (statement of Rep. Molinari)) (emphasis added).
181 Cleveland v. KFC Nat'l Mgmt. Co., 948 F. Supp. 62, 65 (N.D. Ga. 1996) (citing 137
CONG. REC. S4925, 4928 (daily ed. April 24, 1991)(statement of Sen. Dole)) (emphasis ad-
ded). Note also that the new rules do not require "conclusive evidence."
182 See id. at 65.
183 Id. at 64.
184 Id.
185 ldat 65. What are we to take from the above passage? It appears that any evidence
corroborating the plaintiff's story is admissible. The question is what evidence of an alleged
harasser's prior misconduct does not support a plaintiff's story?
186 See e.g,, STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG Er AL., FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 561
(6' ed. 1994) ("There is no doubt that ... Rule [412] is well intentioned" [but] "there are
good reasons to wonder about the wisdom of certain portions of the rule."); Pickett, supra note
47, at 884 ("When submitted to scholars, attorneys, and judges for comment, the vast majority
of responses criticized the new rule [415].").
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harassment suit? What do the new rules mean for litigants? The balance
has been tipped too far in favor of plaintiffs in these actions.
First, with the amendment of Rule 412, "the ability of defense attor-
neys to use plaintiff's prior conduct [to prove welcomeness] has been
limited."'187 Second, Rule 415 allows the sexual history of the accused to
be mined for damaging incidents. 88 The end result is that defendants in
sexual harassment suits now face two hurdles: (1) they are presumptively
precluded from presenting evidence that may show the allegedly harass-
ing behavior was not "unwelcome"; and (2) unrelated evidence of the
accused's prior sexual history may be used to smear him or her. This
section examines some of the arguments supporting the revision of one
or both of these rules.
A. THE DIFFERENCE IN BURDENS OF PROOF BETWEEN CRIMINAL AND
CIVIL CASES
Rule 412 was originally designed to apply only to criminal cases. 89
However, as previously noted, the Violent Crime Control and Law En-
forcement Act of 1994 made Rule 412 applicable to civil cases.' 90 There
is, however, an important distinction between criminal and civil cases
with respect to the burden of proof. In a criminal trial, the due process
clause of the United States Constitution requires the prosecutor to per-
suade the factfinder beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary
to constitute the crime charged.' 9 ' In a civil trial, however, the plaintiff
must show only that the facts essential to his case were established by a
"preponderance of the credible evidence .... ,,192
These definitions are not self-explanatory. Beyond a reasonable
doubt "[i]s that state of the case, which, after the entire comparison and
consideration of all of the evidence, leaves the minds of the jurors in that
condition that they cannot say they feel an abiding conviction, to a moral
certainty, of the truth of the charge."193 Thus, in a criminal case, the jury
must have an abiding conviction, to a moral certainty of the defendant's
guilt in order to convict. 194
187 Carey, supra note 25, at 50.
188 See FED. R. EvID. 415.
189 See WEIS NBERGER, supra note 63, at 170.
190 See Violent Crime Control and Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322,
§ 40141, 108 Stat. 1796,.1918 (1994); see also supra Part ll.C.
191 See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363-64 (1970) (emphasis added).
192 COMMITrEE ON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, Ass'N. OF SUP. CT. JusncEs, NEW
YORK PATrERN JURY INs-rlUCrIONS - CIvI. 1:23 (2d ed. 1974) [hereinafter Naw YORK PAT-
TERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS] (emphasis added).
193 Commonwealth v. Webster, 59 Mass. (1 Cush.) 295, 320 (1850).
194 See id. (emphasis added).
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A preponderance of the evidence requires that the evidence that sup-
ports the plaintiff's claim appeal to the jurors "as more nearly represent-
ing what took place than that opposed to his claim." 195 Simply stated,
preponderance of the evidence means the greater part of the credible
evidence. 196
Because only a preponderance of evidence is required in civil cases,
it is a huge step to import an evidentiary standard designed only for use
in criminal cases to the civil context. In this instance, it is fundamentally
unfair to the defendant to exclude relevant evidence that would weigh in
his or her favor (under Rule 412) while including evidence that weighs
against him (under Rule 415). It is for this reason that members of the
Supreme Court expressed concern that the proposed amendment would
encroach on the rights of defendants and refused to extend Rule 412 to
civil cases. 197
B. CHARACTER EVIDENCE IS BARRED FOR A REASON
"In a court of law... evidence offered to show that a defendant
must have done a particular act on a particular occasion because it con-
forms to his alleged character is highly suspect and generally
inadmissible."198
During everyday life, we often use character reasoning. It makes
perfect sense to take someone's past behavior into account when trying
to determine how he or she will behave in the future. 199 In fact, many
say that past behavior is the best indicator of future behavior. So the bar
on character evidence cannot be rationalized on the ground that it is not
"relevant," for it may make a fact at issue "more probable or less proba-
195 NEw YORK PATrERN JURY INSTRUC'rONS supra note 203.
196 See id.
197 See Letter from Chief Justice Rehnquist, supra note 20 (the Court, under the Rules
Enabling Act, withheld approval of "that portion of the proposed amendments to Rule 412
which would apply that Rule to civil cases ...."); see also supra notes 70-72 and accompany-
ing text.
198 Coates v. Wal-Mart, 976 P.2d 999, 1013 (N.M. 1999) (Franchini, J., dissenting).
199 See Edward J. Imwinkelried, Undertaking the Task of Reforming the American Char-
acter Evidence Prohibition: The Importance of Getting the Experiment off on the Right Foot,
22 FoRDHAm URB. L.J. 285, 289 (1995). The author states:
Outside the courtroom, laypersons routinely rely on character reasoning. 'It is per-
fectly logical to take past performance into account in making all kinds of important
personal decisions.' The character evidence prohibition cannot be defended on the
ground that evidence of an accused's other crimes is logically irrelevant .... How-
ever, both at common law and under the Federal Rules of Evidence, evidence that is
technically logically relevant may be excluded when realistically, the evidence poses
probative dangers that outweigh its probative worth.
Id. (citations omitted).
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ble" as required by Rule 401 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 200 The
problem with character evidence is that people give it too much weight
and use it for the wrong reasons.
One ironic aspect of the 412 - 415 conundrum is that the arguments
advanced in support of Rule 412 cut against the application of Rule 415.
As one court stated in excluding evidence of an alleged victim's prior
sexual behavior pursuant to Rule 412:
[E]vidence that a sexual assault victim has engaged
in . . .sexual relations with the defendant in the past
under similar conditions may have some logical rele-
vance to the question of consent to the act charged, and
evidence of prior sexual activity with the defendant
under dissimilar circumstances may also have some logi-
cal relevance, but "(w)hen both identity of persons and
similarity of circumstances are removed, probative value
all but disappears. 201
For the same reasons that Rule 412 has some merit, Rule 415, which
allows for evidence of a defendant's prior conduct, is bad law and bad
policy.
1. Character Evidence is Overvalued
One of the biggest dangers with character evidence is that persons
tend to "overvalue" it.202 An illustrative example of overvaluation is a
jury's evaluation of scientific evidence. 20 3 Jurors give the proffered ex-
pert testimony too much weight because it possesses "a posture of mystic
infallibility. ''2°4 Expert testimony is obviously probative, but it may not
be as probative as the jury considers it.
a. Low Probative Value of Character Evidence
Rule 415 is based on a view of sexual offender behavior that does
not mesh well with psychological and sociological evidence. 20 5 The new
rules are based on arguments that the probative value of prior-sexual-
200 See FED. R. Evm. 401 ("'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to
make the existence of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence.").
201 Truong v. Smith, 183 F.R.D. 273, 275 (D.Colo., 1998) (quoting Abraham P. Ordover,
Admissibility of Patterns of Similar Sexual Conduct: The Unlamented Death of Character for
Chastity, 63 CORNELL L. REv. 90, 106 (1977)) (emphasis added).
202 See Imwinkelried, supra note 210, at 290.
203 See id.
204 Id. (internal citations omitted).
205 See Pickett, supra note 47, at 899.
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offense evidence is extremely high. 206 Proponents describe this type of
evidence as "exceptionally illuminating" on questions of later actions. 207
As one State Supreme Court Justice stated: "[H]owever influential
on popular opinion, evidence of other wrongful behavior is generally
considered non-probative and irrelevant in a court of law .... ,,208 In
fact, the general prohibition on using uncharged-misconduct evidence
(Rule 404) to prove propensity exists largely because most "uncharged-
misconduct evidence is only weakly relevant to the issue of a defendant's
action at a later date."20 9 In short, evidence of a defendant's character is
a poor indicator of his or her conduct on a specific occasion. 210
Psychological research confirms the common law's suspicion that
character evidence is overvalued.211 Studies show that people tend to
overestimate the predictive value of character evidence.212 These studies
show that, given some information about another person's behavior (i.e.,
evidence of an individual's prior misconduct), people tend to conclude
that a person's later behavior will accord with the information they have
been given.213
The problem is that "it is generally accepted in the scientific com-
munity that predictions of future dangerousness are, at best, only one-
third accurate. '2 14 A series of psychological studies at U.C.L.A. indicate
that most behavior is dependant on highly specific situational stimuli.2 1-5
This research dispels the widely-held view that people behave in a man-
ner consistent with their character traits.216 Yet, ability to predict future
activity from past misconduct is central to the justification the congres-
sional sponsors gave for Rules 413-415.217
Evaluating charges of sexual misconduct against the backdrop of
allegations of past misconduct will lead the jury to overestimate the fu-
ture dangerousness of the accused. Acts of violence or aggression are
206 See id.
207 137 CONG. REc. S3240 (daily ed. Mar. 13, 1991) (statement of Sen. Thurmond intro-
ducing section 801 analysis) ("In general, the probative value of such evidence is strong, and is
not outweighed by any overriding risk of prejudice.").
208 Coates v. Wal-Mart, 976 P.2d 999, 1013 (N.M. 1999) (Franchini, J., dissenting).
209 Pickett, supra note 47, at 886 (citing EDWARD J. IMNVINKELRIED, UNCHARGED MISCON.
DUCT EVIDENCE § 2:18 (1994)) (emphasis added).
210 See Miguel Angel Mendez, California's New Law on Character Evidence: Evidence
Code Section 352 and the Impact of Recent Psychological Studies, 31 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1003,
1052 (1984).
211 See id. at 1044.
212 See id.
213 See id.
214 Moreno, supra note 5, at 550.
215 See id.
216 See id. ("at least 66% of all positive predictions of future violence will be mistaken
and these so-called 'dangerous' individuals will not commit the predicted future crimes").
217 See supra notes 191-92 and accompanying text.
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much more likely to be triggered by situational variables than by a con-
sistent character trait.218 To this end, Justice Blackmun once stated:
"[T]he unanimous conclusion of professionals in this field [is] that psy-
chiatric predictions of long-term future violence are wrong more often
than they are right. '219
The empirical evidence does not support the congressional spon-
sor's assumption that future sex offenses can be accurately predicted
based on allegations of prior sexual misconduct.220 The overwhelming
majority of sociological and psychological evidence suggests that past
misconduct is a poor indicator of future dangerousness. 221 As one author
stated in response to the passage of Rules 413-415: "[N]othing in the
modem study of psychology would suggest any need or justification for
[the] wholesale rejection of. . . common law rules in . . . a particular
subset of trials. '222
b. Low Probative Value of Prior Sexual Misconduct
In addition to character evidence (in general) being weakly proba-
tive as to future conduct, past sexual misconduct (in particular) is even
less probative as to future conduct.223 In fact, "the recidivism rate for
sexual offenses is lower than the rate for other serious crimes. '224 For
example, the recidivism rate for burglary (31.9%) is four times higher
than that for rape (7.7%).225
Several Federal Bureau of Investigation studies confirm that the rate
of recidivism for sex offenses is quite low when compared to that of
other serious crimes. 226 Recidivism rates also vary radically among
types of sex offenses.227 As one author has stated: "lilt is silly to genera-
lize about ... the recidivism of sex offenders as a broad category. '228
218 See Mendez, supra note 221, at 1044.
219 Moreno, supra note 5, at 551 (citing Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983)).
220 See id. at 550.
221 See id. at 550-51.
222 Leonard, supra note 17, at 305.
223 See Imwinkelried, supra note 210, at 297.
224 Id. at 297-98 (citing Thomas J. Reed, Reading Goal Revisited: Admission of Un-
charged Misconduct in Sex Offender Cases, 21 AMER. J. CiIm. L. 127, 149-50 (1993)).
225 See id. at 298 (citing David P. Bryden and Roger C. Park, "Other Crimes" Evidence
in Sex Offense Cases, 78 MiNN. L. Rav. 529, 572 (1994)).
226 See Leonard,. supra note 17, at 339 (citing EDWARD J. IMIVINKELRIED, UNCHARGED
MISCON ucr EvIDmNcE § 4.16, at 45 (1984)).
227 See id.
228 Id.
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c. High Intuitive Value
i. Character Evidence in General
The Supreme Court's rationale for the historical ban on prior bad-
act evidence is as follows:
The state may not show defendant's prior trouble with
the law, specific criminal acts, or ill name among his
neighbors, even though such facts might logically be
persuasive that he is by propensity a probable perpetrator
of the crime. The inquiry is not rejected because char-
acter iS irrelevant; on the contrary, it is said to weigh
too much with the jury and to so overpersuade them as
to prejudge one with a bad general record and deny him
a fair opportunity to defend against a particular charge.
The overriding policy of excluding such evidence, de-
spite its admitted probative value, is the practical experi-
ence that its disallowance tends to prevent confusion of
the issues, unfair surprise and undue prejudice.229
The psychological community considers character traits to be fairly
weak predictors of future conduct.230 The problem, however, is that
character evidence carries a very high intuitive value, which means that
the jury may "greatly overvalue character evidence as a predictor of con-
duct and make an inaccurate assessment of the facts."'23 '
People attribute behavior too much to the personal attributes of the
actor and too little to the context of the actions. 232 Psychologists call this
phenomenon the "fundamental attribution error. '233 When attempting to
attribute the cause of behavior to a specific source, people tend to "over-
estimate the importance of personal or dispositional factors relative to
environmental influences. '234 When presented with character evidence,
juries are likely to make broad determinations and expect "consistency in
behavior or outcomes across widely disparate situations and contexts. ' '235
229 United States v. Enjady, 134 F.3d at 1430 (citing Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S.
469, 475-76 (1948)) (emphasis added).
230 See Leonard, supra note 17, at 311.
231 Id. (emphasis added).
232 See Lee Ross, The Intuitive Psychologist and His Shortcomings: Distortions in the
Attribution Process, in 10 ADvANCEs IN ExPERnvA.rrA. SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 173 (1977), re-
printed in CoGNmvE THEORIES IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 337 (L. Berkowitz ed., 1978).
233 See id.
234 Id. at 184.
235 Id.
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ii. Bad Character Evidence - Devil's Horns
Particularly troubling is that jurors give greater weight to evidence
of misconduct and dishonesty than to evidence of good conduct or be-
havior.236 If presented with two pieces of information that are equally
probative, one good and one bad, people will give more weight to the
bad piece of information. 237 As one author stated: "[A] single negative
trait is more prepotent than its opposite positive. '238
The factor that most induces jurors to overestimate the probative
value of character evidence is what psychologists call the "halo ef-
fect. '239 In the context of evidence of prior misconduct by the accused,
however, it might be more aptly called the "devil's horns effect. '240 This
term refers to the propensity of people to judge others on the basis of one
"bad" quality.2 4 1
In one of the best-known studies of jury decision-making, Harry
Kalven and Hans Zeisel studied a series of trials in which defendants had
engaged in sexual behavior that fell short of the legal definition of a
particular crime.242 In each of the cases, the jury was so outraged by the
defendant's conduct that it ignored distinctions of law and found him or
her guilty.243 As one commentator stated: "[B]ad thoughts tend to drive
out good thoughts, and sexual thoughts tend to drive out all other
thoughts entirely."'' 44
In a sexual harassment case, "the use of remote allegations and evi-
dence, which raise the specter of prejudice, due process violations, and
mistake, presents a significant threat to the fundamental principles of
fairness and impartiality underlying our criminal justice system. '245
Therefore, even though both sides may introduce evidence as to the ac-
cused's character, the jury is likely to place more weight on evidence of
bad conduct or untrustworthiness. 246
236 See Mendez, supra note 221, at 1045.
237 See id. at 1045-46 ("Psychologists have found that people give greater weight to unfa-
vorable, unpleasant or socially derogatory information about a person than to information of
equal intensity but of a positive dimension.").
238 Id. at 1046.
239 See id. at 1047.
240 See id.
241 See id.
242 See HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANs ZEIsEL, THE AMImcAN JuRy 160-61, 178-79
(1966).
243 See id.
244 Jeffrey Rosen, Jurisprurience: Graphic sexual evidence tends to get people's atten-
tion, as lawyers (including President Clinton) knew even in the pre-Monica era, NEw YORKER,
Sept. 28, 1998, at 34, 37. The author later states "By its very nature, explicit sexual material
overwhelms all other arguments and ideas ...." Id. at 37.
245 Moreno, supra note 5, at 551-52 (1997).
246 See id.
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2. Character Evidence is Misused
Another danger with character evidence is the risk of "misdecision"
or "prejudice." 247 Rule 415 was intended to protect the public against
those who commit offenses such as sexual harassment. However, as it
widens both the scope of evidence that may be admitted and the purposes
for which evidence may be considered, Rule 415 creates the distinct dan-
ger of convicting defendants based solely on past behavior.248
One example of "misdecision" is considering a defendant's liability
insurance in a personal injury case.249 The defendant's liability insur-
ance has nothing to do with his or her fault in the case at bar, but the jury
may be tempted to consider the defendant's insurance for two reasons.
First, the jury may believe that the defendant would not purchase liability
insurance unless he or she planned to engage in risk-seeking activity.
Second, the jury will likely speculate that the defendant will not "actu-
ally" pay the damages, his or her insurance will. In either case, the jury
is "misusing" the existence of the defendant's liability insurance. 250
As it turns out, Congress has chosen to single out the offenses that
are "most likely to trigger the risk of misdecision."251
a. Punishing Defendants Who "Got Off"
Where the defendant has a history of bad actions for which he was
not charged or not convicted, the jury may convict the defendant based
solely on the fact that he or she "got away with it."252 The jury is
tempted to punish the defendant for prior misconduct rather than the
charge at hand.253 Research "indicates that admission of a defendant's
prior bad acts significantly increases the chances that a jury will find
liability or guilt. '254 As one author stated:
When jurors are advised that an accused has a record of
prior sexual offenses, including perhaps some for which
he had never previously been charged or convicted, the
danger is not merely that they will take that evidence as
247 Imwinkehied, supra note 210, at 290.
248 See id.
249 See id.
250 See id.
251 Id. at 297.
252 Id. at 291 (citing Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 361-62 (1990) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) ("One of the dangers inherent in the admission of extrinsic offense evidence is that
the jury may convict the defendant not for the offense charged but for the extrinsic offense.
This danger is particularly great where ... the extrinsic evidence was not the subject of a
conviction; the jury may feel that the defendant should be punished for that activity even if he
is not guilty of the offense charged.")).
253 See Pickett, supra note 47, at 887.
254 Id. (citing HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANs ZEisEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 160-61, 178-79
(1966)).
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a decisive reason to believe he is guilty now. On the
contrary, such evidence has widely been presumed to
carry the risk of unfair prejudice because of the grave
possibility that the jurors, even if they do not conclude
that the defendant is. guilty, of the crime charged beyond
a reasonable doubt, will be inclined to convict him (at
least in part) on the basis of their disapproval of his prior
crimes, or their hunch that he has committed other
crimes for which he was never caught, or their fear of
letting him remain on the streets to commit future
crimes-especially if he was never punished or the ju-
rors feel that he was not punished enough.255
b. Punishing Defendants Based on Morality
In addition to punishing someone who "got off," jurors are likely to
punish someone whose behavior, while not illegal, does not conform to
their idea of morality. As one author stated: "The risk of misdecision is
greatest when the jury is likely to find the character of the accused's
uncharged misconduct repugnant or revolting. '25 6 As it so happens,
Congress has chosen to single out the most morally repugnant subset of
cases. The Washington Supreme Court has observed: "[T]he potential
for prejudice is at its highest ... in sex cases. '257
The widespread contempt with which the public views suspected
sexual offenders will lead juries to punish defendants regardless of evi-
dence pointing toward guilt or innocence. 258 The "devil's horns effect"
discussed above, coupled with the jury's inclination to punish defendants
based on morality, makes evidence of prior misconduct particularly
dangerous .259
C. OBJECTIONS SPEcnIc TO RULE 412
The reason for admitting evidence of the alleged victim's prior sex-
ual conduct at work seems commonsensical. The Supreme Court has
determined that to maintain a claim for hostile work environment sexual
harassment, the alleged victim must show that the conduct was "unwel-
come. ' 260 The general approach for proving welcomeness is showing
255 James Joseph Duane, supra note 170, at 110.
256 Imwinkelried, supra note 210, at 296.
257 Id. at 296 (citing State v. Coe, 684 P.2d 668, 673 (Wash. 1984)).
258 See Pickett, supra note 47, at 901.
259 See supra Part IV.B.l.c.ii.
260 See Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986); see also supra Part I.B.
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that the alleged victim solicited or invited the conduct.261 Without evi-
dence of the complainant's behavior, the factfinder cannot determine
whether the actions were unwelcome. In essence, if the alleged victim is
cracking dirty jokes with the guys, she cannot come back later and say
that she was offended by the banter.
Based on the welcomeness standard, "[c]omplainants have had dif-
ficulty establishing that sexual conduct was unwelcome where they have
contributed to a sexually charged workplace. '262 For example, in Reed
v. Shepard, a hostile work environment claim failed because the alleged
victim welcomed the sexual high jinks engaged in by her co-workers. 263
The Court noted that the alleged victim took part in the allegedly offen-
sive activities.264 She contributed to the sexually charged work environ-
ment by using offensive language, engaging in exhibitionistic behavior,
participating in sexual horseplay, and participating in sexual gift-
giving.265
1. Courts Were Reaching the Same Result
Even before 412 was applicable in civil cases, courts were limiting
the admissibility of evidence of the alleged victim's character.2 66 For
example, in Mitchell v. Hutchings, the court excluded evidence of the
plaintiff's sexual conduct that was remote in time or place.267 The court
held that while evidence of sexual conduct in the workplace is relevant to
the Title VII analysis, unlimited discovery and presentation of sexual
conduct evidence was not required:
[The defendant] cannot possibly use evidence of sexual
activity of which he was unaware or which is unrelated
to the alleged incidents of sexual harassment as evidence
to support his defense... Given the annoying and em-
barrassing nature of this discovery, the court holds, as a
matter of law, that Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure preponderates against its discoverability.2 68
261 See BARBARA LINDEMAN & DAVID D. KADUE, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN EMPLOYMENT
LAW 39 (1997 Supp.) (citing Cronin v. United Serv. Stations, 809 F. Supp. 922, 929 (M.D. Ala
1992).
262 Id.
263 See Reed v. Shepard, 939 F.2d 484, 491-92 (7' Cir. 1991).
264 See id. at 486.
265 See id. In another example, the alleged victim used foul language, asked co-workers
about their sexual activity, molded and displayed figures with large genitals, and was involved
in an incident where her supervisor's pants were pulled down. Her claim failed. See Marshall
v. Nelson Electric, 776 F. Supp. 1018, 1023 (N.D.Okla 1991).
266 See ALBA CONTE, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE: LAW AND PRACTICE 266
(1st ed. 1994).
267 See 116 F.R.D. 481 (D.Utah 1987).
268 Id. at 484.
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Thus, although amended Rule 412 explicitly addresses this problem,
"courts likely possess the power to exclude much of this evidence under
other provisions. '269
2. The Evidentiary Bar Has Been Raised Twice
The amendment to Rule 412 was predicated on the assumption that
evidence introduced by the defendant to prove welcomeness is highly
prejudicial and has little or no probative value.270 If this is the case, most
evidence intended to show welcomeness would be excluded by the bal-
ancing test set forth in Rule 403. Under Rule 403, relevant "evidence
may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the
jury .... "271
In the years preceding Rule 412's Amendment, judges were exclud-
ing evidence that the defense bar attempted to introduce to show wel-
comeness when its probative value was lacking. As one author stated:
"There is a good argument that under Rule 403 Federal Trial Judges
would have reached results that are very similar to those reached under
412 . "..."272
This suggests that trial judges' attitudes with respect to the proba-
tive value of evidence intended to prove welcomeness was, and is, in line
with the drafters of New Rule 412. Consequently, when evaluating evi-
dence under the new standard, judges will exclude too much relevant
evidence. In stating that this evidence is highly prejudicial, is extremely
harmful to the alleged victim, and has a low probative value, Congress
has in effect raised the bar. In stating that the proffered evidence may be
admitted only if the probative value greatly outweighs the potential
harm, Congress has raised the bar again.
V. SUGGESTIONS - SAMPLE LANGUAGE
While the difficulties presented by Rules 412 and 415 are substan-
tial, the solution is simple. A minor modification to the Rules' language
would remove the evidentiary hurdles to defending sexual harassment
suits.
There are several ways to correct the problem. One way is to make
evidence of character admissible against both parties. Alternatively,
character evidence could be inadmissible against either party. Whatever
269 Leonard, supra note 17, at 332.
270 See Monnin, supra note 67, at 1178 ('The probative value of the plaintiffs sexually-
related conduct is nearly always suspect ... .
271 FED. R. EviD. 403.
272 SAL_BURG E" Ai.., supra note 197, at 567.
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the solution, the key is to make the Rules consistent, so that they apply
equally to both parties.
As discussed above, there are many reasons why character evidence
is disfavored in our legal system.273 Thus, it is advisable to presump-
tively exclude character evidence of both parties.274 Sample language
can be found in the Advisory Committee's alternate language for Rule
412, which commentators favored.275 The new Federal Rule of Evidence
would read: "In a civil suit, evidence of sexual behavior or predisposition
is admissible against either party if necessary for a fair and accurate
determination of a claim or defense. '276
The Advisory Committee's Comments could further define what
"necessary for a fair and accurate determination of a claim or defense"
means. 277 The Comments should state that in a civil suit evidence of
sexual behavior or predisposition is admissible if its probative value sub-
stantially outweighs the danger of undue prejudice and unfair harm to the
alleged victim or the accused.
VI. CONCLUSION
Rule 412 unduly restricts the admissibility of relevant and otherwise
admissible evidence that the defendant can present in a sexual harass-
ment case.278 Conversely, Rule 415 provides that highly prejudicial evi-
dence of a defendant's prior sexual history is presumptively
admissible.27 9
In support of Amended Rule 412, one author stated: "Because intro-
duction of proof of welcomeness distorts the fact-finding process by in-
fusing often irrelevant and highly prejudicial information into sexual
harassment proceedings, an affirmative limitation on the use of such in-
formation is necessary. '280 Perhaps. The question then is why does this
rule not apply with equal force to defendants?
The effect under the current evidentiary scheme is to allow evidence
of the accused's sexual behavior while excluding such evidence with re-
spect to the alleged victim. Although Congress has found an unpopular
group to target, the effect is still a fundamental unfairness to defendants
273 See supra Part IV.B.
274 Members of the defendant's bar will likely argue that character evidence is necessary
to prove "welcomeness." A happy medium is desired so that the defendant can address this
element of sexual harassment without mining the alleged victim's sexual history for irrelevant
and prejudicial evidence.
275 See Monnin, supra note 67, at 1170.
276 Id. at 1174 (citing Proposed FED. R. EviD. 412(b)(4))(emphasis added).
277 Id. (citing Proposed FED. R. Evro. 412(b)(4))(emphasis added).
278 See FED. R. Evnr. 412.
279 See FED. R. EviD. 415.
280 Monnin, supra note 67, at 1170.
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accused of sexual harassment. In an effort to right past legal wrongs,
Rules 412 and 415 swing the pendulum too far the other way. The inter-
ests of justice and consistency demand that this wrong be remedied so
that all are treated fairly before the law.

